INTRODUCTION
In early While many seek to draw parallels between the current situation and the 1975 referendum, it is more likely that debate will resemble the most recent plebiscite to take place within the United Kingdom, that on Scottish independence.
In the 2014 Scottish referendum the debate quickly narrowed to economic issues and specifically how could an independent Scotland survive outside of the UK. The circumstances are of course different this time; the EU is a Customs Union with enhanced economic and political cooperation, while the UK is a unitary state with regionally devolved administrations.
The common thread running through both debates is firstly what would the economic impact of secession be and secondly to what extent any future arrangement would be better or worse than the status quo?
The latter of these questions is the hardest to deal with. Her Majesty's Treasury (2016) have released their analysis which assumes three post-BREXIT scenarios in which the UK forms a trading relationship through the European Economic Area; a bilateral agreement or through World Trade Organisation. They find that GDP by 2030 could be 3.8, 6.2 or 7.5 per cent lower in each of those scenarios respectively. Interestingly the modelling exercise undertaken by HMT attaches importance to trade patterns with countries based on issues such as a common language and whether that country was a former colony. A recent ESRI (2015) The more interesting aspect of the Oxford Economic report was the difference between possible outcomes for Northern Ireland and the UK under each of the different scenarios. This highlights the central question in this paper, how and why will the impact of BREXIT differ in Northern Ireland? It will reflect the scoping exercise carried out in the ESRI report in order to provide a better understanding of the outcomes of the Oxford Economics report.
In order to examine what the impact of BREXIT might be, this paper will look at the patterns of trade for Northern Ireland and the sectors of the economy involved. It will seek to examine the impact of trade disruption on the Northern Ireland labour market within sectors and industries most affected. It will also analyse issues such as Foreign Direct Investment, EU funding and the All-Island economy.
It is important to note from the outset that the analysis presented here details the mechanisms by which BREXIT may affect the Northern Ireland economy. Previous studies have outlined a number of different post-BREXIT scenarios and it is up to the reader to decide which of those scenarios is most likely. It is also up to the reader to decide whether the divergence in outcomes between Northern Ireland and the UK as a whole are warranted based on analysis presented here of their differing interaction with the EU.
BREXIT AND NORTHERN IRELAND TRADE
The existing dataset for Northern Ireland's trade is somewhat incomplete. For tradeable goods there are reliable statistics from Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs. The figures on service exports are less conclusive. The new Broad Economy Sales and Exports Survey (NISRA, 2015) estimates that total exports (goods and services) from Northern Ireland in 2014 were £9.7bn 1 .
Of this, 60 per cent is accounted for by goods and services in the Manufacturing sector. Overall 56 per cent of goods and services exports go to the EU and two thirds of all EU exports are bound for the Republic of Ireland. (Felbermayr & Larch, 2013) . Outside the EU, the UK would no longer be subject to the food standards that apply in the single market governing the production of food and the use of pesticides or genetically modified 
Miscellaneous Manufactures
Other commodities nes the equivalent figure for Northern Ireland. As the UK is the largest producer of oil and gas within the EU (ONS, 2015) mineral fuels account for 9 per cent of Great Britain's exports to the EU while Machinery and Transport accounted for over one third. Given such larges disparities in the make-up of trade, it follows that disruption to EU trade will affect Northern Ireland and Great Britain in different ways.
Trade in fuels and pharmaceuticals may prove more robust to limited trade barriers than food and agricultural produce. In particular the system of non-tariff barriers operated by the EU would severely limit trade in food sector irrespective of any favourable negotiations on tariffs on other products. Many of the same non-tariff barriers also exist in the US thus further limiting the ability of the food sector to rapidly expand trade to that market in the event of a BREXIT.
Moreover, as of 2015 Great Britain exports more goods to non-EU countries than it does the EU.
The EU accounts for 47 per cent of Great Britain's total goods exports compared to almost 55
per cent of Northern Ireland. Furthermore the make-up of exports from Great Britain to non-EU countries bears greater resemblance to the make-up of its EU trade. It may therefore be easier for exporters in Great Britain to expand existing non-EU trade links in the event of a BREXIT.
Figure 7 Great Britain non-EU Goods Exports 2015
Source: Regional Trade Statistics (HMRC)
In summary, the EU is a more important export market for Northern Ireland than it is for the rest of the UK. Within EU trade Northern Ireland's exports could be more vulnerable to trade barriers while the rest of the UK may be able to expand non-EU trade to make-up for EU losses. The Computer sector, which includes computer gaming, software development and data processing, accounts for the vast majority of exports within this group. Research and Development, which accounts for 11 per cent of exports, deals with R&D in both social science as well as areas such as biotechnology. It is worth emphasising that although the ENIS does provide some good data, more recent research has highlighted a significant proportion of 78.6%
4.3% 11.1% While the figures from the ENIS may be instructive they only account for just over one quarter of the estimated £2.3bn of services exports from Northern Ireland. Unfortunately the BESES data do not to date provide separate estimates for goods and services exports, thus it is impossible to identify to what extent services are concentrated in particular industries.
However subtracting HMRC goods exports and non-UK tourism from the BESES export figures can give an indication as to the level of service exports to EU and non-EU countries. Tourism statistics imply that the breakdown in tourists between EU and non-EU tourists in 2014 was almost exactly 2:1 and that total expenditure by non-UK visitors in 2014 and £373m. When tourism expenditure is subtracted along with goods exports for both EU and non-EU, estimates would imply that the EU accounts for roughly £1.9bn of service exports while non-EU countries account for £1.5bn.
Previous research has identified that EU membership enhances the trade volumes across many sectors but in particular the areas of agriculture, textiles, trade services and transport equipment (Nahuis, 2004) . The dearth of data on services exports exposes a key challenge in estimating the impact of a BREXIT on the Northern Ireland economy, but the most recent data on goods exports expose certain sectoral vulnerabilities. Figure 9 shows that in many ways Northern Ireland's labour market is quite similar to that of the UK as a whole but with a few important differences. NI has an unusually large Retail sector, Figure 12 shows the breakdown of manufacturing jobs by sub sector within Northern Ireland.
Manufacturing
Food manufacturing accounts for almost one quarter of all manufacturing jobs in Northern
Ireland, followed by Transport Equipment, Metal Products and Rubber & Plastics. While transport manufacturing is important to both EU and non-EU trade, it is quite clear that the labour market is more focused towards output in areas more heavily traded with the EU. Figure   13 shows how the Northern Ireland manufacturing sector has changed in employment terms since the UK joined the European Community, as it was then, in 1973. what the statistics on goods exports alluded to, specifically that employment from the food manufacturing sector would be highly sensitive to a BREXIT and while this sector is very important to Northern Ireland's economy, it has much less significance for the UK as a whole. constituencies could be expected to see disproportionate losses to a disruption in EU trade. In particular the higher rate of female manufacturing employment in these areas is largely confined to food manufacturing and that could be disproportionately hit by a reduction food exports arising from a fall in EU trade. Mac Flynn, 2015) . However, at present the retail sector provides employment to a large section of the population and it is likely that a disruption to EU trade, particularly with the Republic of Ireland, may cause significant uncertainty and possible job losses in the sector. there is no doubt that it plays a significant role in boosting productivity, attracting talent and raising overall skills levels. There is also little doubt as well that this is an area of economic development that will be significantly impacted by Northern Ireland's continuing relationship with the EU.
In Northern Ireland 99 per cent of firms are owned by residents of either Northern Ireland or Great Britain. However these firms only account for 86 per cent of total employment in Northern Ireland. 13 per cent of employees work for externally owned firms and almost a third of these are owned by residents of the Republic of Ireland. As Figure 12 shows the US accounts for 20 per cent with France and Germany each accounting for just over 5 per cent. distinctions. An IMF report (Walsh & Yu, 2010) categorises FDI as primary, secondary or tertiary based on the industry. It found that openness is the most important of the macroeconomic determinants of FDI, and that this is particularly true for the tertiary or services sector. As most service sector FDI is aimed at selling to the market in which it is located, this result is strange but appears that trade openness can be perceived by investors as a guarantee of general liberalization of the economy and therefore more powerful determinant of sentiment towards the economy as a whole. Blonigen & Piger (2011) infrastructural investments as the statistically significant determinants under differing econometric specifications.
Once again, the degree to which capital inflows such as FDI will be affected by BREXIT will be determined by the exact trading structures that will be adopted in the event of a vote to leave. It is possible to ascertain how much the UK government pays to the EU each year and to work out a notional 'Northern Ireland Contribution' from that. In 2015 the UK paid £17.6bn to the EU, however this was automatically reduced by £4.9bn which is the rebate which the UK has negotiated since 1985, bringing its total contribution down to £12.9bn. This is up from the £8.7bn paid in 2009 and it is forecast to rise to £15.2bn by 2020. Using Northern Ireland's share of UK population it is possible to calculate a hypothetical Northern Ireland total contribution of £366m (2.9 per cent of the total figure).
However Northern Ireland's hypothetical contribution could also be more accurately calculated. Economic Area which keeps it outside the EU but which grants it access to the Single Market.
Norway has agreed to pay on average €866m or roughly £680m annually for the period 2014-2021 2 . Norway has a GDP per capita roughly 1.6 times that of the UK so adjusting for the size of the economy as a whole (rather than on population measures), the UK would pay roughly £4.97bn for the same arrangement. This would amount to nearly one third of the UK's existing total EU contribution and would significantly reduce any net gain for Northern Ireland. However if the UK decides only to apply for entry to the European Free Trade Area, this payment would significantly reduce, but this would leave Northern Ireland with no access to the Single Market.
Depending on exactly how Northern Ireland's contribution is calculated it would fair to suggest that the best Northern Ireland could hope for would be to break even in the event of a BREXIT.
It would also be fair to say that there are a range of more negative outcomes for Northern
Ireland which are not beyond the bounds of reasonable expectation.
BREXIT AND THE ALL-ISLAND ECONOMY
One of the key tenets of the Good Friday One area where cooperation has been established is in the energy sector with the establishment of the Single Electricity Market in 2007. Northern Ireland is heavily dependent on both coal (19%) and gas (72%) for its electricity generation (ONS, 2014) . Northern Ireland's gas supply is also heavily reliant on imports which are transmitted through an interconnector from Scotland that comes on shore in Islandmagee. Should the UK leave the EU it could put energy imports from mainland Europe at risk. This prospect is equally concerning for the Republic of Ireland but its reliance on gas for electricity generation is lower (60%) and it will have access to a limited supply from the Corrib gas field when that comes on stream (SEI, 2011).
Northern Ireland needs to heavily invest in renewable energy in order to maintain energy security whilst almost meeting international climate change targets. The creation of the single electricity market has significantly enhanced the ability of NI firms to invest in renewable technology by providing a larger prospective market. The uncertainty caused by a BREXIT could affect investment decisions by firms that are vital to the creation of a renewable energy sector on the Island of Ireland that is so crucial to security of output. High energy costs have become one of the main barriers to inward investment in Norther Ireland and have directly contributed to significant job losses across the manufacturing sector in 2015. BREXIT could add significant disruption to on-going government efforts to drive down energy costs for firms operating within Northern Ireland.
The share of North-South trade on the Island of Ireland has flat-lined since the 2008 crash (InterTrade Ireland, 2016) , but the Republic of Ireland remains a more important export market for firms in Northern Ireland than it does vice versa. This means that to whatever degree BREXIT disrupts the All-Island economy it is likely to be more damaging to Northern Ireland firms.
CONCLUSIONS
It was noted at the beginning of this paper that the long-term impact of BREXIT would be determined by the shape of the resulting relationship between the UK and the EU. Research to date has forecast that GDP in the UK could be disrupted by as little as 1 per cent or as much as 9
per cent in a worst case scenario. In reality the nature of the UK's trading relationship will be decided by political factors and there is no economic modelling that can predict such outcomes.
It is harder to avoid the conclusion that there will be disruption to trading links with the EU in the short-term due to uncertainty if nothing else. Northern Ireland is vulnerable to this disruption particularly across the agriculture and food sector and many areas of manufacturing.
That Northern Ireland could replace this trade by seeking greater links outside the EU is speculation confined to the longer term.
BREXIT would introduce disruption to the development of an All-Island economy which has undeniably failed to live up to the expectations set out in the Good Friday Agreement. BREXIT therefore represents a disproportionate risk for Northern Ireland in the short to medium term, and any evaluation of long-term impacts requires individual judgement about the future prospects for a post-BREXIT UK economy.
